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ABSTRACT 
In a complex information system, controlling the access to resources is 
challenging. As a new generation of access control techniques, Attribute-Based Access 
Control (ABAC) can provide more flexible and fine-grained access control than Role-
Based-Access Control (RBAC). XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) 
is an industrial standard for specifying ABAC policies. XACML policies tend to be 
complex because of the great variety of attribute types for fine-grained access control. 
This means that XACML policies are prone to errors and difficult to debug. This paper 
presents a first attempt at automating the debugging process of XACML policies. Two 
techniques are used for this purpose: fault localization and mutation-based policy repair. 
Fault localization produces an ordered list of suspicious policy elements by correlating 
the test results and the test coverage information. Mutation-based policy repair searches 
for potential fixes by mutating suspicious policy elements with predefined mutation 
operators. Empirical studies show that the proposed approach is able to repair various 
faulty XACML policies with one or two seeded faults. Among the scoring methods for 
fault localization that are studied in the experiment, Naish2 and CBI-Inc are the most 
efficient.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Access control is a mechanism for regulating user access to resources in an 
information system. As information systems are getting more and more complex, it is 
highly desirable to separate access control policies from system functionality since the 
functionality is subject to frequent changes. Another benefit of the separation is that 
access control policies can be changed on the fly without re-compiling. 
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) grants or denies access based on various 
attributes of authorization elements[1], including predefined characteristics of subjects 
(e.g., job title and age), resources (e.g., data, programs, and networks), actions, and 
environments (e.g., current time and IP address). Thus ABAC offers a flexible and fine-
grained access control.  
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is a standard 
specification language for ABAC, which was proposed by OASIS [2]. XACML supports 
a variety of data types and functions for specifying attributes and their operations. While 
XACML policies allows for fine-grained access control, the complexity makes it more 
prone to faults caused by misunderstanding of requirements, coding errors during 
development and maintenance phase. Faults in XACML policies can cause serious 
consequences such as unauthorized accesses or denial of service.  
Several methods have been proposed to generate test inputs (i.e., access requests) 
from a given XACML policy [3][4][5][6][7][8][9]. The expected responses (or oracle 
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values) are determined by examining access control requirements. A policy’s actual 
response to a test input is compared with the oracle value. A test fails if the actual 
response is different from the oracle.  
The debugging of XACML policies can happen in multiple phases in the system 
life cycle, including development, maintenance and operation. During the development 
phase, tests are created according to access control requirements. Before the deployment 
of the system, the tests are executed for verification and validation. During system 
maintenance, when security or functional requirements are changed, the XACML policy 
is run against the regression tests to find out broken tests or faults introduced by the 
changes. After the system is put into operation, there still might be residual faults as 
current testing and verification technologies cannot guarantee to eliminate all faults. 
When unexpected access control decisions are observed, we can find out the actual access 
requests that triggered the residual faults in the system logs. These access requests are 
similar to the tests in development and maintenance phases, and can be added to the 
regression test suite. 
Test failure provides little insight in which element in the XACML policy is 
wrong. Actually testing is not concerned with finding out where the faults are and how to 
fix them. The activity of finding out faults and fixing them is often referred to as 
debugging. Similar to debugging a program, debugging an access control policy can be 
difficult and frustrating, especially when the access control logic is complex and the 
access control policy is large. Debugging an access control policy often relies on trial and 
error, especially when there are multiple faults. Thus a technique that automatically 
locates faulty elements in an XACML policy and fixes them is highly desirable. 
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Problem Definition 
The policy repair problem is formulated as follows: given a faulty XACML policy 
(or policy set), along with a test suite where at least one test fails when executed against 
the policy (or policy set), make one or more changes to the faulty policy (or policy set) so 
that the revised policy will pass all the tests.  
The above definition assumes an adequate test suite, which is not always true in 
reality. Intuitively, the more adequate the test suite is, the better the policy repair 
performs. As mentioned before, the test cases of an XACML policy may come from 
policy testing during system development and maintenance or from actual access requests 
in an operational system. Each test consists of test input (access request) and oracle value. 
The oracle value is used to determine whether the test passes or fails. An access request 
consists of attribute names, data types, and values. 
It is possible that an attribute name, data type, or value in an access request is 
invalid. The response to such a request is typically NotApplicable or Indeterminate. In an 
operational system, access requests with invalid attribute names or values may come 
from malicious users who attempt to gain unauthorized access or render the system out of 
service. During the development and maintenance stages, policy testing should include 
not only normal test inputs but also tests with invalid attribute names and values. 
In the empirical studies, for each subject policy, tests are generated automatically 
to achieve the Multi-Condition/Decision Coverage (MC/DC). MC/DC originated from 
NASA’s RTCA/DO-178B document, which requires level-A aviation software to achieve 
MC/DC of the software structure [15]. Prior works has applied MC/DC to automatic test 
generation of XACML policies in order to achieve high assurance of XACML policies 
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[16]. The MC/DC test suite of an XACML policy satisfies the MC/DC of each policy (or 
policy set) target, each rule target, and each rule condition. It also includes a test to make 
each policy (or policy set) target and each rule to evaluate to error (i.e., to cover the 
Indeterminate decisions). 
Proposed Approach 
The proposed approach to repair a faulty XACML policy includes two major 
steps: fault localization and mutation-based repair.  
As shown in Figure 1.1, the proposed approach to policy repair is an iterative 
process because there might be multiple faults in the faulty policy. The approach first 
produces a list of suspicious policy elements by fault localization, and then generates 
mutants by applying mutation operators to the ranked suspicious elements, starting from 
the most suspicious one. If a mutant is a plausible fix, the process is repeated, otherwise 
the next mutant is tried. The repair fails when all mutants have been tried and none of 
them is a fix. 
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Figure 1.1 Process of Automatic Repair 
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the first step of each iteration is ranking suspicious 
elements in a policy. This is accomplished by fault localization. As shown in Figure 1.2, 
a faulty policy P and a test suite are given as input. Each test in the test suites consists of 
an XACML request and the oracle value (expected decision). Given an XACML policy 
and an XACML request as input, XACML engine will output a decision. Test results are 
produced by comparing the actual decision and the oracle value. Meanwhile, coverage 
information is collected. Then a coverage matrix is built by combining the test results and 
coverage information. From the coverage matrix the suspicion score of each policy 
element can be calculated using a scoring method. Finally the policy elements are sorted 
by their corresponding suspicion scores, producing a sorted list of suspicious elements. 
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Figure 1.2 Process of Fault Localization 
Chapter 4 will describe illustrate the fault localization, mutation based repair 
process in more details with a running example. 
Outline 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes related 
work about the research topic. Chapter 3 gives an introduction to the structure of 
XACML policies, and illustrates it with an example. Chapter 4 describes the proposed 
approach with a running example then presents the general process. Chapter 5 elaborates 
on the implementation. Chapter 6 reports the empirical studies. Chapter 7 concludes this 
paper.
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CHAPTER TWO: RELATED WORK 
The existing work on policy debugging focuses on firewall policies. Marmorstein 
et al. used failed tests to locate faulty rules in a small firewall policy containing only 
several rules [10]. It does not identify faulty rules according to different fault types. 
Hwang et al. used failed tests to find the potential faulty rules based on structural 
coverage of firewall rules [11]. Two types of faults, wrong decisions and wrong 
predicates, were considered. In our approach, both passed and failed tests are used. Chen 
et al. proposed an approach to automatic correction of five types of faulty firewall rules: 
wrong order, missing rules, wrong predicates, wrong decisions, and wrong extra rules 
[12]. Part of this approach converts the given firewall rules into a firewall decision 
diagram (FDD) as a compact representation for reasoning about faulty rules. Compared 
to firewall rules, XACML policies are much more complex. Firewall rules are defined 
over a fixed set of network attributes and primarily specified in propositional logic, while 
rules in XACML policies are specified with predicates and functions with various data 
types. 
Various fault localization techniques have been proposed for software debugging. 
This paper has adapted the scoring methods from spectrum-based fault localization (i.e., 
SBFL) for software debugging [13]. A program spectrum is an execution profile that 
indicates which parts of a program are active during a run. SBFL analyzes the differences 
in program spectra for passed and failed runs. Although the scoring methods in our 
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approach are from SBFL, the variables are defined upon firing of policy elements, not 
coverage of policy elements. 
Several testing methods have been proposed to generate test inputs from XACML 
policies [3] [4][5][6][7][8][9]. Testing is concerned with whether or not there are faults, 
whereas our work is concerned with how to locate and fix the faults. It is worth pointing 
out that the existing testing methods all use policy mutation to evaluate testing 
effectiveness. This paper, however, exploits mutation to fix faults. Our prior work has 
investigated coverage-based and firing-based approaches to fault localization of XACML 
policies [14]. It shows that firing-based fault localization outperforms coverage-based 
fault localization. Based on this result, this paper takes a step further to apply firing-based 
fault localization to rank policy elements for repair purposes.
9 
 
CHAPTER THREE: XACML POLICIES 
Structure of XACML Policies 
The basic elements in XACML 3.0 language model are policy set, policy, rule, 
target, condition and combining algorithm [2]. Figure 3.1 shows the relationships 
between the main elements of XACML3.0. 
 
Figure 3.1 Language elements of XACML 3.0[14] 
At the root of each XACML document is a policy or policy set. A policy or policy 
set defines the circumstances under which whether an access request should be granted. 
A policy set contains a target, a combining algorithm, and one or more policies or policy 
sets. The target decides if the XACML document is applicable to an access request. 
Policy combining algorithms include deny-overrides, permit-overrides, 
deny-unless-permit, permit-unless-deny, first-applicable, and 
only-one-applicable, etc. The combining algorithms combines the decisions of 
individual component policies or policy sets to form a final decision. For example, when 
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the combining algorithm is deny-overrides and there is one component policy that 
evaluates to Deny, then the authorization decision of the whole policy set will be Deny, 
regardless of the decisions of other component policies. 
Similarly, a policy contains a target, a combining algorithm, and one or more 
rules. A rule is the smallest unit of decision making. In addition to a target, a rule also 
contains an effect and a condition. The effect is either Permit or Deny. And the condition 
is a boolean expression which refines the applicability. As shown in Table 3.1, given an 
access request, the response of a rule can be Permit, Deny, NotApplicable or 
Indeterminate. The response is NotApplicable when the access request doesn’t match 
with the target or condition of the rule. And the response is Indeterminate only when an 
error occurs during the evaluation. 
Table 3.1 Response of a Rule  
target condition effect response 
false - - NotApplicable 
true false - NotApplicable 
true true Permit Permit 
true true Deny Deny 
 
In addition, a rule, policy, or policy set may have one or more obligation or advice 
expressions. This paper will not discuss about obligation and advice as they are irrelevant 
to the topic. 
A Sample XACML Policy 
Figure 3.2 shows an example XACML policy named KmarketBluePolicy (line 2). 
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Figure 3.2 A Sample XACML Policy 
The rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides (line 2). The policy’s target 
(lines 3-12) means role=”blue”, where role is an attribute in the subject 
category and its type is string. There are four rules: total-amount (line 13), 
deny-liquor-medicine (line 31), max-drink-amount (line 57), and permit-
rule (line 85). The policy target and rules are summarized in plain text in Table 3.2. 
The policy target (denoted as PT) is role=”blue”. For rule total-amount, its 
effect is Permit, its target is totalAmount>100, and its condition is omitted. Its 
decision would be Permit if totalAmount>100 evaluates to true. Similarly, rule 
deny-liquor-medicine would result in a Deny decision if resource-
id>Liquor ∨ resource-id=Medicine evaluates to true. Rule max-drink-
amount has both target and condition components. Its decision would be Deny if both 
its target and condition evaluate to true (i.e., resource-id=Drink ∧ amount>10). 
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Rule permit-rule has neither a target nor a condition. It results in a Permit decision 
whenever it is applied. 
Table 3.2 Main Policy Elements in the Sample Policy 
Policy Element Target Condition Effect 
Policy Target(PT) role = Blue -  
total-amount totalAmount > 100 - Permit 
deny-liquor-
medicine 
Resource-id > “liquor” 
∨ resource-id = 
“medicine” 
- Deny 
max-drink-amount Resource-id = “drink” account > 10 Deny 
permit-rule - - Permit 
 
Similar to the case of policy set, the authorization decision of a policy depends 
not only on the target and rules, but also on the rule combining algorithm. In this 
example, if the rule deny-liquor-medicine evaluates to Deny, the whole policy 
will evaluates to Deny, as the rule combining algorithm is deny-overrides. In such 
case, the remaining rules in the policy will be skipped since their decision won’t affect 
the overall decision. 
Note that although Policy Decision Point (PDP) outputs only 3 kind of decisions: 
Permit, Deny and Indeterminate, internally Indeterminate is divided into 3 different 
decisions: Indeterminate {P}, Indeterminate {D} and Indeterminate {DP}. A rule or 
policy produces a Indeterminate {P} when an error occurred during evaluation, and the 
decision would be Permit if the error had not occurred. Similarly, a rule or policy 
produces a Indeterminate {D} when an error occurred during evaluation, and the decision 
would be Deny if the error had not occurred. An Indeterminate {DP} is produced when 
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Indeterminate {P} and Indeterminate {D} are combined. To make full use of coverage 
information from the PDP, all 6 kinds of decisions are used and a strict matching strategy 
is adopted, e.g. a test is deemed as failed if the oracle is Indeterminate {D} and the actual 
result is Indeterminate {P}.
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CHAPTER FOUR: AUTOMATIC REPAIR OF XACML POLICIES 
A Running Example 
Consider the sample XACML policy in Chapter 3. It has two faults:  
a. The effect of rule total-amount should be Deny, not Permit;  
b. The target of rule deny-liquor-medicine should be resource-
id=“Liquor” ∨ resource-id=“Medicine”, not resource-
id>“Liquor” ∨ resource-id=“Medicine”.  
The original version of KmarketBluePolicy is one of the policies in a 
demonstration application of Balana [17], which is currently the only open-source 
implementation of XACML 3.0.  
Table 4.1 shows the MC/DC test suite generated automatically from the correct 
version of KmarketBluePolicy by the open source XPA (XACML Policy Analyzer) tool1. 
The valid attribute names in access requests are role, resource-id, amount, and 
totalAmount. A test input may also consist of invalid attribute names and their 
attribute values. In Table 4.1, there are seven tests where all attribute names are valid. 
Each of the remaining tests (Test 1, 3, 5, 10) includes an invalid attribute name. The 
invalid attribute names are generated randomly to produce error conditions when the 
policy is tested. In this case, XPA simply uses Indeterminate as the attribute value, which 
indicates that an error occurrence is expected during policy testing. 
                                                 
1 https://github.com/dianxiangxu/XPA. It includes the policies and test suites used in this paper. 
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Table 4.1 Test suite for the sample policy 
No 
Input (attribute names and values in request) Oracle 
Value role resource-id amount total 
Amount 
invalid attribute, value 
1         
nzocphnmz1, 
Indeterminate 
NotApplicable 
2 ak      0  NotApplicable 
3 
Blue      0 6m9dv7gdw6, 
Indeterminate 
Indeterminate 
{DP} 
4 Blue k  0  Permit 
5 
Blue Drink  0 j4yxpw95g1, 
Indeterminate 
Indeterminate 
{DP} 
6 Blue Drink 0 0  Permit 
7 Blue Drink 11 0  Deny 
8 Blue Liquor  0  Deny 
9 Blue Medicine  0  Deny 
10 
Blue    o5eqqyvjdx, 
Indeterminate 
Indeterminate 
{DP} 
11 Blue   101  Deny 
 
When the test suite in Table 4.1 is executed with the sample policy in Chapter 2, 
Test 5, 6, 8, and 11 shall fail. Consider Test 11, where role=”Blue” and 
totalAmount=101, the oracle value is Deny. However, the actual response of the 
faulty policy is Permit because the effect of rule total-amount is Permit.  
The goal is to repair the given KmarketBluePolicy policy such that the revised 
policy will pass all the tests in Table 4.1. Ideally, the revised policy will be identical to 
the original KmarketBluePolicy in Balana’s Kmarket demonstration application. 
The first step is to determine the policy elements (including the policy target, and 
individual rules, and the rule combining algorithm) that likely contain the faults. This is 
achieved by ranking all policy elements according to their suspicion scores obtained from 
the correlation between the firing information of policy elements and the test execution 
results (i.e., pass and fail). The higher the score, the more likely that the policy element is 
faulty.  
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A policy target (or policy set target) is said to be fired by a test if it is evaluated to 
true when the test is executed. A rule is said to be fired by a test if its target and condition 
are both evaluated to true when the test is executed. Note that the rule combining 
algorithm will always be evaluated. Therefore, the firing information of rule combining 
algorithm is not meaningful. Its suspicion score can be defined in different ways (e.g., 
highly suspicious or least suspicious). For simplicity, herein the rule combining algorithm 
is treated as the most suspicious element in a policy and attempts to change the rule 
combining algorithm first. The reason is that the number of repair attempts is small as 
there are only 11 rule combining algorithms. 
Table 4.2 Firing of the policy target and rules in the sample policy 
Test 
No 
Firing of policy target and rules Test  
Result 
PT 
total-
amount 
deny-liquor-
medicine 
max-drink-
amount 
permit-
rule 
1      Pass 
2      Pass 
3 x    x Pass 
4 x    x Pass 
5 x  x   Fail 
6 x  x   Fail 
7 x  x   Pass 
8 x    x Fail 
9 x  x   Pass 
10 x    x Pass 
11 x x   x Fail 
Starantula 0.583 1.0 0.636 0.0 0.538  
 
Table 4.2 shows the firing information of the policy target and each rule in the 
sample policy when the test suite in Table 4.1 is executed, where ‘x’ means that the 
policy element in the given column is fired by the test in the given row. The set of failed 
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tests is {Test 5, Test 6, Test 8, Test 11}. To correlate policy elements with test results, the 
following four variables are associated with each policy element: 
 𝑎00: number of passed tests in which the policy element was not fired  
 𝑎01: number of failed tests in which the policy element was not fired 
 𝑎10: number of passed tests in which the policy element was fired   
 𝑎11: number of failed tests in which the policy element was fired 
For each policy element, the subscript 𝑖 in 𝑎𝑖𝑗 refers to whether the policy element 
is fired (𝑖 =1) or not (𝑖 =0), whereas 𝑗 is concerned with the number of passed tests (𝑗 =0) 
or failed tests (𝑗 =1). For each policy element, a suspicion score is calculated by feeding 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 to a scoring method and then sort all policy elements in the descending order of their 
scores. For example, the suspicion scores of the policy target and rules in Table 4.2 are 
0.583, 1.0, 0.636, 0, and 0.538, respectively when the following Tarantula scoring 
method [18] is applied: 
𝑆𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑙𝑎 =
𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
+
𝑎10
𝑎10 + 𝑎00
 
The resultant ranking is <total-amount, deny-liquor-medicine, PT, permit-rule, 
max-drink-amount >. Then the rule combining algorithm (denoted as CA) is put at the 
beginning of the rankings. Therefore, the complete suspicion ranking of all policy 
elements is <CA, total-amount, deny-liquor-medicine, PT, permit-rule, max-drink-
amount>. 
Next step would be repairing the faulty policy according to the suspicion rankings 
of the policy elements. The faulty policy is repaired by changing the suspicious policy 
elements, starting from the most suspicious one. Herein the action of changing a policy is 
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referred as policy mutation and a revised policy as a policy mutant. Policy mutation is 
performed by applying predefined mutation operators to the current policy. Mutation 
operators are defined with respect to the constructs of policy elements. Table 4.3 shows 
the mutation operators used in the current approach. Each operator aims at fixing a 
particular type of faults in a policy element. 
   Table 4.3 Mutation operators and target faults.  
Operator Meaning Fault to be fixed  
Change Rule Combining 
algorithm (CRC)  
Replace the existing rule combining 
algorithm with another rule 
combining algorithm 
Wrong rule combining algorithm 
Change Rule Effect 
(CRE)  
Change the rule effect by replacing 
permit with deny or deny with 
permit 
Wrong rule effect 
Add Negation Function 
(ANF) 
add the not function as the first 
function of a rule condition element 
Missing negation in a condition 
element 
Remove Negation 
Function (RNF) 
Remove the not function in a rule 
condition 
Extra negation in a condition 
element 
Replace Comparison 
Function (RCF) 
Replace the comparison function in 
a target with a different one 
Wrong comparison function in 
target 
Change Comparison 
Function (CCF) 
Change a comparison function in 
rule condition 
Wrong comparison function in 
rule condition 
 
In the above example, the rule combining algorithm is assumed to be the most 
suspicious element. So the mutation operator CRC (change rule combining algorithm) is 
applied to the faulty policy first. Consider changing the rule combining algorithm from 
deny-overrides to permit-overrides. The resultant policy mutant is denoted 
as CRC1. Run the test suite against CRC1 and CRC1 will fail the following set of tests 
{Test 3, Test 5, Test 7, Test 8, Test 9, Test 10, Test 11}. Apparently CRC1 is not a valid 
repair. As it is unknown how many faults are there in the policy, however, CRC1 might 
be a step toward the right direction or it might have introduced another fault. In the 
former case, the debugging process should be repeated until the faulty policy is repaired 
successfully. In the latter case, we would want to give it up and try other policy mutants. 
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Assuming that multiple faults in the same policy are independent, whether or not the 
mutation is in the right direction can be determined by examining the set of failed tests. 
The mutant is considered to be a plausible intermediate fix if the set of tests failed by the 
policy mutant is a subset of the tests failed by the faulty policy before the mutation. 
Apparently, CRC1 is not a plausible fix because it fails more tests than the example 
faulty policy does. As there are other candidate rule combining algorithms, we continue 
to create new CRC mutants and evaluate if any of these mutants is a plausible fix.  
For KmarketBluePolicy, it turns out that none of the CRC mutants is a plausible 
fix. So now all possible attempts about the most suspicious policy element are completed.  
Now we move on to the next candidate element – the rule total-amount. Since a rule 
has several components (target, condition, and effect), there can be a number of 
applicable mutation operators. For simplicity, here we first consider the mutation 
operator CRE (change rule effect). The mutant after applying CRE to the rule total-
amount is denoted as CRE1, where the rule effect is changed from permit to deny. 
Running the test suite against CRE1 will result in the following set of failed tests: {Test 
5, Test 6, Test 8}, as shown in Table 4.4. This is a subset of the failed tests in Table 4.2. 
Thus, CRE1 is a plausible fix. Then we continue to apply the above debugging process to 
CRE1. Specifically, we create new suspicion rankings of the policy elements in CRE1 
except for the rule combining algorithm because it is already shown non-promising as 
discussed before. According to Table 4.4, the suspicion rankings are <deny-liquor-
medicine, PT, permit-rule, total-amount, max-drink-amount>.   
Table 4.4  Suspicion scores of policy elements in CRE1 
Test 
No 
Firing of policy elements Test 
 Result 
PT 
total-
amount 
deny-liquor-
medicine 
max-drink-
amount 
permit-
rule 
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1      Pass 
2      Pass 
3 x    x Pass 
4 x    x Pass 
5 x  x   Fail 
6 x  x   Fail 
7 x  x   Pass 
8 x    x Fail 
9 x  x   Pass 
10 x    x Pass 
11 x x    Pass 
Starantula 0.571 0.0 0.727 0.0 0.471  
 
Now the repair attempt focuses on the rule deny-liquor-medicine in 
CRE1. The applicable mutation operators are CRE (change rule effect) and RCF (replace 
comparison function in target). CRE is not promising. Instead, a RCF mutant that 
replaces the function “string-greater-than” to “string-equal” will pass all the tests. This 
mutant, named CRE1_RCF2_1, is a successful repair of the faulty policy 
KmarketBluePolicy. And it is identical to the original policy KmarketBluePolicy. 
General Process for Automatic Policy Repair  
Figure 1.1 shows the general process of automatic policy repair. The two key 
techniques of automatic policy repair are fault localization and mutation-based repair. 
Fault localization aims to rank all policy elements according to their suspicion scores 
obtained from the correlation between the firings of policy elements and the test results. 
In the running example, the Tarantula scoring method is used. In fact, there are various 
scoring methods. Table 4.5 summarizes the scoring methods implemented in the 
proposed approach. Tarantula [18] is one of the pioneer tools for software fault 
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localization. Naish2 and CBI-Inc are among the best performing methods for software 
fault localization, whereas Sokal is among the average ones [13]. These representative 
methods are adapted for use in the fault localization of XACML policies and their 
performance are compared from the perspective of automatic policy repair.  
Mutation-based repair applies mutation operators to each suspicious policy 
element in order to find an intermediate or final fix. If a policy mutant passes all the tests, 
it is a final fix. In this case, the faulty policy has been repaired successfully. If a policy 
mutant fails some tests that are a subset of the failed tests before the mutation, it is 
considered a plausible intermediate fix in the right direction. In this case, we continue to 
apply the debugging process to the policy mutant. However, if no fix is found for the 
current suspicious element after applying all mutation operators, the next suspicious 
policy element is selected for further mutation. If no fix is found after all policy elements 
have tried, then the faulty policy cannot be repaired by the approach. 
Table 4.5 Scoring methods for fault localization 
Method Name Formula 
CBI-Inc 𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎10
−
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
𝑎11 + 𝑎01 + 𝑎10 + 𝑎00
 
Naish2 𝑎11 −
𝑎10
𝑎10 + 𝑎00 + 1
 
Sokal 2(𝑎11 + 𝑎00)
2(𝑎11 + 𝑎00) + 𝑎01 + 𝑎10
 
Tarantula 𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
𝑎11
𝑎11 + 𝑎01
+
𝑎10
𝑎10 + 𝑎00
 
 
The proposed approach is not intended to repair all possible faulty policies 
automatically due to the theoretical and implementation challenges. Automatic policy 
repair essentially tries to search all possible mutants of the faulty policy. For a policy 
with 𝑛 faults, the mutation operators may be applied to each policy element for up to 𝑛  
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times. The number of possible mutants grows exponentially with the number of faults 
(i.e., the number of repetitions that mutation is applied). For a multi-fault policy with a 
large number of policy elements, it could be too slow to be of practical use when no fix 
can be found. The proposed approach can estimate remaining time, and allows using a 
predefined timeout to terminate the search. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the 
empirical studies, our approach can repair faulty XACML policies with one or two 
seeded faults.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter presents how the proposed approach to policy repair is implemented. 
The program architecture consists of four major components: Coverage Analysis, 
Fault Localization, Mutation, and Repairing.  
Coverage Analysis 
The component Coverage Analysis deals with running tests and collecting 
coverage information. There are four modules in this component: Coverage, 
TestSuite, PolicyCoverageFactory, and PolicyTracer. Figure 5.1 shows 
the UML class diagram of this component. 
Coverage 
The coverage information of rules and targets are defined differently, so there are 
two kinds of coverage information: RuleCoverage and TargetCoverage. They are 
modeled as two classes and they both extend the abstract class Coverage, so that both 
kind of coverage information can be handled in a uniformed way.  
There can be only three evaluation results of a target: MATCH, NOT_MATCH and 
INDETERMINATE. The evaluation result is INDETERMINATE when an error occurred 
during the evaluation. If no error occurred during the evaluation, and the target is 
evaluated to be true, the evaluation result is MATCH, otherwise it is NOT_MATCH. So 
evaluation result of a target is modeled as Enum type TargetMatchResult. 
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The coverage information of a rule is more complex as a rule has a target and a 
condition, the coverage of which must be both taken into account. As summarized in 
Table 3.1, when a rule is evaluated, the target is evaluated first, and the condition is 
evaluated only if the target is evaluated to be true. 
 
Figure 5.1 UML Class Diagram of Package Coverage 
The evaluation results of an individual target and condition can be defined in a 
uniformed way: The result is TRUE if the target or condition is evaluated to be true; 
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FALSE if it is evaluated to be false; ERROR if an error occurred during evaluation. And 
there are two additional cases: EMPTY if the target or condition is an empty element, 
which can be regarded as a special case of TRUE; NOT_EVALUATED if the target or 
condition is not touched by the test. A target is not touch if the evaluation has finished 
before this target is reached. A condition is not touched if the result of the target is 
FALSE or ERROR. This uniformed representation of evaluation results is modeled as 
Enum type IntermediateCoverage. 
The coverage information of a rule is a combination of that of the target and 
condition in that rule. Rule coverage can be defined in two ways, with different 
granularity.  
One way is to define it in the same way as in Table 3.1, except that the result 
would be INDETERMINATE if an error occurred during the evaluation of either the 
target or the condition. This is modeled by Enum type RuleDecisionCoverage. 
Another definition is more fine grained: the result is FALSE_TARGET if the 
target is evaluated to be false; FALSE_CONDITON if the condition is evaluated to be 
false; ERROR_TARGET if an error occurred during the evaluation of the target; 
ERROR_CONDITON if an error occurred during the evaluation of the condition; 
BOTH_TRUE if both are evaluated to be true. This is modeled in Enum type 
CombinedCoverage. 
TestSuite 
The module TestSuite models a test suite generated from an XACML policy. 
It consists of a list of XACML requests and a list of corresponding oracle values.  Each 
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pair of request and oracle value is a test. In addition, a list of request notes is defined in 
the class to ease debugging. A request note is used as an annotation of a request.  
A test suite can be created from the code that generates test suites from XACML 
policies or loaded from hard drive. The second way allows users to load previously saved 
auto-generated tests, or to load manually created tests, which is handy for debugging 
purpose. A saved test suite consists of a CSV file and some XACML request files. In the 
CSV file, in the first column are file paths to requests, which are XML files, and in the 
second column are oracle values. 
The runTests() method runs the test suite on an XACML policy, and it calls 
the private method runTest() to run a single test in the test suite. Both methods are 
instrumented by AspectJ to collect coverage information while the tests are running. 
runTest() in turn calls PolicyRunner.evaluate() to evaluate an XACML 
request against an XACML policy. 
PolicyCoverageFactory and XpathSolver 
The PolicyCoverageFactory module is a “global variable” to store 
coverage information. All the data and method members in this module are static.  
PolicyCoverageFactory has a coverageMatrix to store a matrix of 
Coverage objects. The number of rows is equal to the number of tests in the 
TestSuite, and the number of columns is equal to the number of policy elements in 
the XACML policy. An example of coverageMatrix is the one in Table 4.2. 
PolicyCoverageFactory also has results, a list of booleans, to store test 
results. The size of results is equal to number of tests in the TestSuite.  
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PolicyCoverageFactory.init() is called when a test suite starts to run, 
and initialize the coverageMatrix with an empty list. The newRow() method is called 
when a test starts to run, and adds a new row in the coverageMatrix. The 
addCoverage() method is called when a policy element is touched by a test, and 
inserts a Coverage object to the last row in the coverageMatrix. 
When adding the Coverage of a policy element to the coverageMatrix, we 
need to know which column to add the Coverage object to, so a mapping from each 
policy element to a column in the coverageMatrix is needed. And this is the purpose 
of the data member mapping in the PolicyCoverageFactory.  
The coverageMatrix has a flat structure in which one policy element 
corresponds to a row in the coverageMatrix. However XACML policies have a 
hierarchical structure: a policy set contains a policy set target, and one or more policies or 
policy sets; a policy contains a policy target, and one or more rules. Therefore the 
structure of XACML policies must be “flattened” when mapping a policy element to a 
column in the coverageMatrix.  
Simply giving each policy element an index number in the order they are visited 
while traversing over the XACML policy will not work. This is because the XACML 
engine might have implemented short-circuit evaluation (the balana implementation does 
have), so some policy element might be skipped when evaluating a request. For example, 
if an XACML policy is a policy set that consists of two policies: Policy1 and Policy2. 
There are two rules in Policy1: Rule1 and Rule2. And the rule combining algorithm of 
Policy1 is first-applicable. Suppose for a given request, Rule1 is fired(both target and 
condition are evaluated to be true), then the XACML engine will skip Rule2, and go on 
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evaluating Policy2. In such scenario, the coverage information of the following policy 
elements will be written to the wrong columns in the coverageMatrix. 
This is solved by mapping each policy element’s XPath to its column index. 
XPath is a part of the XSLT standard. It uses path expressions to select a node an XML 
document. For example, the first rule in the sample XACML policy in Figure 3.1 can be 
selected by the absolute XPath “/*[local-name()=’PolicySet’ and 
@PolicySetId=’KMarketBluePolicy’]/*[local-name()=’Rule’ and 
@RuleId=’total-amount’]”. The XPath expression means that starting from the root 
node, first look for a node whose local-name is “PolicySet”, and has an attribute 
“PolicySetId” that equals to “’KMarketBluePolicy”; then from the child nodes of this 
node, look for a node whose local-name is “Rule”, and has an attribute “RuleId” that 
equals to “total-amount”.  The “*” in the XPath expression means ignoring namespace 
prefix. The first rule can also be selected by the relative XPath “//*[local-
name()=’Rule’ and @RuleId=’total-amount’]”. The double slash at the 
beginning of the path expression means that this is a relative path so the node is not 
necessarily a child of the root node.  
According to the specifications of XACML, the policy element ID attribute must 
be unique in an XACML policy. So each policy element can be uniquely identified by its 
local-name and policy element ID attribute, and only one node will be selected even if 
using relative XPath. And since there is no getParent() method in PolicySet, Policy, 
Rule classes in the Balana implementation of XACML engine, it is impossible to 
construct an absolute XPath from a policy element. Therefore, the relative XPath is used 
for mapping policy elements to column indices. 
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The module XpathSolver in the component PolicyUtils is used for 
getting the XPath of policy elements in an XACML policy. Figure 5.2 shows the UML 
class diagram of XpathSolver. The method 
getEntryListRelativeXPath(Document) returns XPath strings of all policy 
elements in the order they are visited in a recursive traversal of the XACML document. 
PolicyCoverageFactory.init() uses this method to set the mapping, thus 
getting a mapping from XPath of each policy element to their column index in the 
coverageMatrix. Latter while the tests are running, each time a policy element is 
touched by a test, the column index of the policy element is looked up in the mapping, 
and a Coverage object is created and inserted at the column index in the last row. 
 
Figure 5.2 UML Class Diagram of XpathSolver 
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PolicyTracer 
PolicyTracer is used to change the behavior of some methods related to the 
evaluation of XACML requests in the XACML engine for the purpose of collecting 
coverage information. This functionality is accomplished with AspectJ. AspectJ is an 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) extension for Java. The aim of AOP is to increase 
modularity by putting code that is not central to business logic and appears multiple 
places into one module, e.g. logging. 
Basic concepts in AspectJ include join points, pointcuts, and advices. A join point 
is a point in a program where additional code can be joined into, e.g. method execution, 
object initialization, field read and write. A pointcut is an expression that matches one or 
more joint points. For example, in the PolicyTracer code shown in Figure 5.3, line 45-47 
defines a pointcut called runNewTestSuite, which matches the runtTests() 
method in the TestSuite class. An advice is a piece of code that runs before, after or 
around a join point that matches a pointcut. During execution, when a joint point matches 
a pointcut, the AspectJ runtime automatically invokes the advice associated with the 
pointcut. In Figure 5.3, line 49-53 is an advice associated with the pointcut 
runNewTestSuite. Therefore, before TestSuite.runTests() is called, a 
message is written to log and PolicyCoverage.init() is called. 
 Figure 5.3 shows the source code of PolicyTracer. The advice associated with 
ruleEvaluationPointCut is omitted to save space.  
Line 35-43 defines a pointcut runNewTest and an associated advice that calls 
PolicyCoverageFactory.newRow(), adding a new row in the 
coverageMatrix before every test starts.  
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Line 15-27 defines an advice that gets the XPath of a policy target or policy set 
target, creates a Coverage object, and calls addCoverage() to add the Coverage 
object into coverageMatrix. 
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Figure 5.3 Source code of PolicyTracer 
Line 4-12 defines a pointcut ruleEvaluationPointCut and an associated 
advice that gets the XPath of a rule, creates a Coverage object, and calls 
addCoverage() to add the Coverage object into coverageMatrix. 
Line 55-55 defines an advice that calls 
PolicyCoverageFactory.setResults() to add the test results of the test suite 
to PolicyCoverageFactory.testResults after TestSuite.runTests() 
has finished. 
Fault Localization 
The component Fault Localization deals with fault localization. Figure 
5.4 shows the UML diagram of this package. 
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Figure 5.4 UML Class Diagram of Component Fault Localization 
The module SpectrumBasedFaultLoclizer calculates a suspicion score 
for each policy element basing on the coverage matrix and test results. The coverage 
information defined in the Coverage are Enum types. In order to calculate a score, the 
values in the Enum types must be mapped to numbers. There can be different ways for 
the mapping. In our implementation the “firing” criteria is used: a policy target or a 
policy set target is fired if it is evaluated to be true; a rule is fired only if both the rule 
target and condition are evaluated to be true. In TargetMatchResult, MATCH is 
mapped to 1, other values are mapped to 0; in RuleDecisionCoverage,EFFECT is 
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mapped to 1, other values are mapped to 0. In addition, test results also need to be 
mapped to numbers. If a test passes, the test result is mapped to 1, otherwise mapped to 0.  
The mapping is done in the constructor of 
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer. The coverageMatrix in 
PolicyCoverageFactory is mapped to 
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer.matrix, and testResults  in 
PolicyCoverageFactory. is mapped to 
SpectrumBasedFaultLocalizer.verdicts.  
Fourteen scoring methods are implemented. For example jaccard() 
implements the scoring method jaccard. In the empirical study of fault localization, 
sometimes it is desirable to be able to loop over a list of scoring methods. As in Java 
language methods are not first class functions, this is implemented by way of reflection. 
The method applyFaultLocalizeMethod(String) takes a scoring method 
name as input, and invoke the scoring method using reflection.  
PolicyElementCoefficient bundles the index, suspicion score and rank 
of a policy element together, and used by SpectrumBasedDiagnosisResults, 
which evaluates the effectiveness of a scoring method. The constructor of 
SpectrumBasedDiagnosisResults sorts the policy elements by their suspicion 
score and calls rankSuspicion(List<PolicyElementCoefficient>) to 
give each policy element a rank according to their suspicion score. For example, suppose 
the suspicion scores of 4 policy elements are [0.5, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1], then the rank of them is 
[1, 2, 2, 4]. The method getNumberOfElementsToInspect(int) evaluates a 
scoring method by calculating how many policy element must be inspected in the worst 
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case before the faulty policy element is found out. The input of this method is the index 
of the faulty policy element. For example, suppose in the previous example the second 
policy element is faulty, in the worst case three policy element must be inspected before 
it is found out. And the method 
getAverageNumberOfElementsToInspect(List<Integer>) calculates 
when there are multiple faulty policy elements, on average how many policy elements 
must be inspected in the worst case. Similarly, the input of this method is a list of indices 
of the faulty policy elements.  
The FaultLocalizationExperiment is for empirical study of the 
performance of different scoring methods. It first generates or loads from hard drive a list 
of mutants, then perform fault localization on each mutant, using several scoring 
methods, and writes the number of policy elements to inspect of each pair of mutant and 
scoring method to a CSV file. And in the last row of the CSV file, it appends the average 
number of policy elements to inspect of each scoring method. 
Mutation 
The component Mutation deals with mutating XACML policies. Figure 5.5 
shows the UML class diagram of package mutation. 
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Mutant 
 
Figure 5.5 UML Class Diagram of Component Mutation 
Mutant models a policy mutant. In the Balana implementation of XACML 
engine, Policy class models a policy, and PolicySet class models a policy set. And 
they both extends the AbstractPolicy class. A mutant is an XACML policy too. So 
the Mutant class should have all the public methods and fields of AbstractPolicy. 
Besides that, a mutant has faulty policy element, so Mutant should have a field that 
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stores the indices of faulty policy elements, and a getter method for the field. Meanwhile, 
a mutant is created by mutating either a policy or a policy set, so a Mutant should 
behave like either a Policy or a PolicySet, depending on which one it was created 
from. Henceforth, Mutant is designed to extend the AbstractPolicy, and to have 
an AbstractPolicy as data member, which can be an instance of Policy or 
PolicySet. All the public methods of the data member are “forwarded” to inherited 
methods. Figure 5.6 shows a simplified UML class diagram of these four classes. And 
Mutant has a faultLocations field which stores the indices of faulty policy 
elements, and a getter method for the field. 
 
Figure 5.6 Simplified UML Class Diagram of AbstractPolicy, Policy, PolicySet 
and Mutant 
Mutator 
The Mutator module is used for creating mutants from a Policy, a 
PolicySet or a Mutant.   
All the public methods starting with “create” in Mutator are methods 
implementing a mutation operator. For example, 
createRuleEffectFlippingMutants(String) implements the CRE mutation 
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operator in Table 4.3, which changes the effect of a rule from Permit to Deny, or vice 
versa. 
Because there are too many mutation operators, only a few typical mutation 
operators’ implementation is described in this paper. 
Figure 5.7 Implementation of CRC 
Figure 5.7 shows how the mutation operator CRC is implemented.  
Figure 5.8 Implementation of CRE 
createCombiningAlgorithmMutants(xpathString) 
 mutants = an empty list 
 policyNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString) 
 originalCombiningAlgo = get rule combining algorithm of policyNode 
 for each rule combining algorithm algo: 
  if algo is not equal to originalCombiningAlg  
   set rule combining algorithm in policyNode to be algo 
   create a mutant and add to mutants 
 set rule combining algorithm in policyNode to be originalCombiningAlg 
 return mutants 
createRuleEffectFlippingMutants (xpathString) 
 mutants = an empty list 
 ruleNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString) 
 originalEffect = get effect of ruleNode 
 if originalEffect is equal to “Permit” 
  set effect of ruleNode to “Deny” 
 else  
  set effect of ruleNode to “Permit” 
 create a mutant and add to mutants 
 set effect of ruleNode to be originalEffect 
 return mutants 
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Figure 5.8 shows how the mutation operator CRE is implemented.   
Figure 5.9 Implementation of PTT and RTT 
Figure 5.9 shows how PTT (Policy Target True) and RTT (Rule Target True) is 
implemented. Note that the code makes use of the XACML specification that an empty 
target is always evaluated to be true. 
From the above examples we can see that generally implementing a mutation 
operator takes three steps: find the node to change and store its state; change the node and 
create a mutant from the changed document; restore the node. 
Repairing 
The component Repairing deals with repairing faulty policy elements. Figure 
5.10 shows the UML class diagram of this component. 
The module PolicyRepairer repairs a faulty policy or policy set. The method 
repairSmartly(PolicyMutant, String) repairs a faulty policy or policy set 
by performing fault localization, generating mutants and looking for a mutant that passes 
all tests. Figure 1.1 describes this process. Chapter 4 has a running example of this 
process.  
The mutation-based repair traverses a tree where the root is the faulty policy and 
each node is a policy mutant. As the tree can be very large, it is pruned by excluding 
those branches that are unlikely leading to a successful repair. If the policy mutant in the 
createTargetTrueMutants(xpathString) 
 mutants = an empty list 
 targetNode = xpath.evaluate(xpathString) 
 childNodes = an empty list 
 remove all child nodes of targetNode and add into childNodes 
 create a mutant and add to mutants 
 add all nodes in childNodes into targetNode 
 return mutants 
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current node passes all the tests, the repair is successful. If the set of tests failed by the 
policy mutant is a subset of those failed by its parent, this mutant is considered an 
intermediate fix. In this case, the current node shall be expanded, i.e., apply fault location 
and mutation to the mutant. If this mutant is not an intermediate or final fix, the node will 
not be expanded. 
Another implementation issue is the order of mutation operators in which they are 
applied to the sorted policy elements. We use (𝑃𝐸𝑖) to denote the set of mutants resulted 
from applying mutation operators to the 𝑖-th suspicious policy element. When we run 
tests against the mutants in the set (𝑃𝐸𝑖) and apply mutation operators to the j-th 
suspicious policy element, the resultant set of mutants are denoted as (𝑃𝐸𝑖 , 𝑃𝐸𝑗). For 
(𝑃𝐸𝑖1 , 𝑃𝐸𝑖2 , … , 𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑛), the lesser (𝑖1 + 𝑖2 + ⋯ + 𝑖𝑛)is, the more suspicious this set of 
mutants are. This is handled by a priority queue. 
The method repairRandomOrder(PolicyMutant) follows a similar 
process except that the list of suspicious policy element is not obtained from fault 
localization, but generated randomly. And repairOneByOne(PolicyMutant) is 
similar except that the list of suspicious policy elements is in the order they are in the 
XACML policy. 
The module ExperimentOnRepair performs experiment on repairing of an 
XACML policy with only one faulty element. And the module 
ExperimentMultiFault performs experiment on repairing of an XACML policy 
with one or more faulty elements. The module MutantNode is used as a node in the 
priority queue during repairing an XACML policy with one or more faulty elements. 
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Figure 5.10 UML Class Diagram of Component Repairing 
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CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
The empirical studies aim to answer the following research questions: (a) Can 
faulty XACML policies be repaired automatically? (2) How do the various scoring 
methods for suspicion rankings affect time performance of automatic policy repair?  
In this chapter, firstly the setup of the experiments will be described, then the 
experiment results will be presented and analyzed. 
Experiment Setup 
Since faulty versions of real-world XACML policies are unavailable, the 
experiments rely on mutants of XACML policies. Table 6.1 shows the list of subject 
policies. In order to be representative, the subject policies used for experiment varies in 
size. The number of lines of XML code (LOC) ranges from 227 to 12,803. The number 
of rules ranges from 12 to 640. Continue is an access control policy for a conference 
management system [19]; fedora is “an open source repository system for the 
management and dissemination of digital content”; itrust is “a medical application that 
provides patients with a means to keep up with their medical history and records as well 
as communicate with their doctors”. itrustX (X=5, 10) are expanded versions of itrust 
[20]. They have X times as many rules as itrust. The sizes of the policy files are believed 
to be a good representation of real-world applications because a very large policy is often 
decomposed into a number of manageable policy files.  
The original subject policies are considered to be the correct version. The tests are 
generated automatically from the original policies by the XPA tool using the MC/DC 
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criterion. For each test, its oracle value is the actual response to the access request 
produced by the original policy. The mutants of each policy are also generated 
automatically by the XPA tool. Each mutant is a variation of the original policy with one 
or two faults seeded using the mutation operators in Table 4.3. 
Note that mutation analysis is a common approach to the evaluation of software 
testing and debugging techniques. Program mutation has the following hypotheses: 
a. Mutants are based on actual fault models and are representative of real 
faults 
b. Programs written by developers are close to being correct. This is known 
as the competent programmer hypothesis [21] 
c. Tests that detect simple faults are also capable of detecting complex faults. 
This is known as the coupling effect hypothesis [22]. 
Empirical studies have confirmed that program mutants are indeed similar to real 
faults for evaluating testing techniques [23] [24]. We believe that the competent 
programmer hypothesis and the coupling effect hypothesis are also applicable to 
XACML policies. The mutants in Table 6.1 are representative of real faults because 
mutation operators are defined over an actual fault model of XACML policies [14]. 
Table 6.1 Subject policies, tests, and mutants 
Subject 
Policy 
LOC 
No. of 
rules 
No. of 
tests 
Single fault 
mutants 
Two-fault 
mutants 
continue 229 15 27 75 5,625 
fedora 227 12 31 74 5,471 
itrust 1,283 64 197 324 972 
itrust5 6,403 320 983 163 N/A 
itrust10 12,803 640 1,965 328 N/A 
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The mutants are created by applying the mutation operators in Table 4.3 to the 
correct subject policies. Table 6.1 only includes non-equivalent mutants. An equivalent 
mutant has the same behavior as the original policy -- no failure would be reported when 
it is executed against the given test suite. Thus, the policy repair problem is not 
applicable to equivalent mutants. Note that the number of two-fault mutants grows 
quickly with the increase of policy size due to the combinations of mutation operators. 
The XPA tool is unable to complete the generation of all two-fault mutants for itrust5 or 
itrust10 because of memory and disk space constraints. Due to the large number of 
mutants, our experiments randomly selected 1% of the two-fault mutants of itrust, and 
10% of the single fault mutants of itrust5 and itrust10. 
Experiment Results and Analysis 
The proposed approach is able to repair all mutants in Table 6.1, as the mutation 
operators in Table 4.3 are reversible – a mutant created by one operator can be mutated 
back to the original by the same or another mutation operator. 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 show the average repair time of single fault mutants and 
two-fault mutants, respectively. “Random” refers to the scoring method that ranks all 
policy elements in a random fashion. It is used as a baseline method for identifying 
suspicious elements.  
For a small policy like continue, the performance difference between different 
scoring methods is small, but for large policies the difference is significant. For example, 
for the subject policy itrust10, the best scoring method, CBI-Inc, is about 4 times faster 
than Tarantula, and almost 14 times faster than the random method. This is because larger 
policies have more policy elements so the benefits of a better ranking (a ranking in which 
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the faulty policy element is at the top) is more obvious. Thus for a real world XACML 
policy, the choice of scoring method is crucial to the performance of automated repair. 
And by comparing Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 we can also see that repair time grows much 
faster with the number of faults than with the number of rules, as the number of mutants 
to be examined grows polynomially with the number of rules, but exponentially with the 
number of faults. 
Table 6.2 Repair time of single fault mutants (in seconds) 
  continue fedora itrust itrust5 itrust10 
CBI-Inc 0.053 0.073 0.496 14.813 77.165 
Naish2 0.056 0.079 0.558 14.926 79.827 
Sokal 0.1 0.109 0.645 23.988 124.178 
Tarantula 0.051 0.068 1.367 53.517 370.067 
Random 0.111 0.213 4.409 162.251 1149.35 
 
Table 6.3 Repair time of two-fault mutants (in seconds)  
  continue fedora itrust 
CBI-Inc 0.539 0.371 6.659 
Naish2 0.531 0.466 9.435 
Sokal 2.240 1.042 15.265 
Tarantula 0.497 0.418 46.831 
Random 1.298 2.257 100.705 
 
Figure 6.1 shows the cumulative distributions of repair time of single fault 
mutants for itrust and itrust5. The x-axis stands for how much time it takes at most to 
repair a mutant. The y-axis stands for the percentage of mutants that can be repaired 
within a certain time. All mutants can be repaired eventually, so all curves eventually 
approach 1.0. The steeper the curve is, the shorter time it takes to repair the mutants on 
average. 
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For itrust mutants (on the left), nearly 20% can be repaired instantly. Most of 
them can be repaired in 715 milliseconds using a non-random scoring method. CBI-Inc 
and Naish2 are the most efficient. About 97% mutants can be repaired in 715 
milliseconds. Using Tarantula, more than 80% of mutants can be repaired in 715 
milliseconds. However, it takes 8 times more time to achieve the 80% repair rate when 
the policy elements are ranked randomly. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Cumulative distribution of repair time of itrust and itrust5 mutants 
For itrust5 mutants (on the right), most of them can be repaired in about 13 
seconds. CBI-Inc and Naish2 have almost the same performance. Within 13 seconds, 
both can achieve nearly 95% repair rate, while Sokal can repair more than 90% mutants 
and Tarantula can repair about 75%. Thus if timeout is set to be 13 seconds, the 
probability of fixing a faulty policy within the cutoff time is nearly 95%. 
In brief, if a mutant can be fixed, a more efficient scoring method will make the 
faulty elements appear higher in the suspicion rankings.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper an approach to automatic repair of XACML policies is presented. It 
first ranks suspicious policy elements according to the test execution information and 
then attempts to mutate suspicious policy elements to make all tests pass.  The proposed 
approach also provides several scoring methods for suspicion ranking of policy elements. 
They are an important factor in the overall time performance of automatic policy repair, 
especially for policies of large size. The empirical studies show that our approach can 
automatically repair faulty policies with one or two injected faults and that, among the 
scoring methods, Naish2 and CBI-Inc have the best time performance.   
This work offers the first yet promising attempt to develop techniques for 
automatic repair of XACML policies although the current empirical studies are inherently 
limited due to the general unavailability of real faults in real-world XACML policies and 
the use of policy mutants with only one or two seeded faults. Nevertheless, more efficient 
mutation-based repair techniques can be developed to deal with the search space problem 
for large XACML policies with a number of faults. It is worth pointing out that automatic 
repair is not meant to replace manual debugging of complex policies but to provide useful 
hints on suspicious elements and potential fixes.   
In this paper, the use of MC/DC test suite of XACML policy is thought to be 
critical for the approach to be able to successfully repair the mutants with seeded faults. 
For a real-world faulty policy under debugging, however, the test suite may not be 
MC/DC adequate. Future research may focus on how the coverage and size of test suite 
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affects the success rate of automatic repair. To reduce the search space of mutation-based 
repair, future research may also investigate coarse-grained mutation operators. The 
current mutation operators in the proposed approach only make a small primitive change 
at a time. A coarse-grained mutation can make multiple primitive changes. To do so, 
further research can investigate typical patterns of policy target, rule targets, rule 
conditions in real-world XACML policies and define coarse-grained mutation operators 
with respect to these patterns.
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A.1 KmarketBluePolicy 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Policy xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" 
PolicyId="KmarketBluePolicy" 
RuleCombiningAlgId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:rule-combining-algorithm:deny-
overrides" Version="1.0"> 
  <Target> 
    <AnyOf> 
      <AllOf> 
        <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
          <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">blue</AttributeValue> 
          <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/role" 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-subject" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" /> 
        </Match> 
      </AllOf> 
    </AnyOf> 
  </Target> 
  <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="total-amount"> 
    <Condition> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-
than"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-one-
and-only"> 
          <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/totalAmount" 
Category="http://kmarket.com/category" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="true" /> 
        </Apply> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">100</AttributeValue> 
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      </Apply> 
    </Condition> 
    <AdviceExpressions> 
      <AdviceExpression AdviceId="deny-liquor-medicine-advice" 
AppliesTo="Deny"> 
        <AttributeAssignmentExpression 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text"> 
          <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to do 
more than $100 purchase 
    from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue> 
        </AttributeAssignmentExpression> 
      </AdviceExpression> 
    </AdviceExpressions> 
  </Rule> 
  <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="deny-liquor-medicine"> 
    <Target> 
      <AnyOf> 
        <AllOf> 
          <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Liquor</AttributeValue> 
            <AttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" /> 
          </Match> 
        </AllOf> 
        <AllOf> 
          <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Medicine</AttributeValue> 
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            <AttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" /> 
          </Match> 
        </AllOf> 
      </AnyOf> 
    </Target> 
    <AdviceExpressions> 
      <AdviceExpression AdviceId="deny-liquor-medicine-advice" 
AppliesTo="Deny"> 
        <AttributeAssignmentExpression 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text"> 
          <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to buy 
Liquor or Medicine 
    from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue> 
        </AttributeAssignmentExpression> 
      </AdviceExpression> 
    </AdviceExpressions> 
  </Rule> 
  <Rule Effect="Deny" RuleId="max-drink-amount"> 
    <Target> 
      <AnyOf> 
        <AllOf> 
          <Match MatchId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:string-equal"> 
            <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">Drink</AttributeValue> 
            <AttributeDesignator 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-category:resource" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string" MustBePresent="true" /> 
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          </Match> 
        </AllOf> 
      </AnyOf> 
    </Target> 
    <Condition> 
      <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-greater-
than"> 
        <Apply FunctionId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:function:integer-one-
and-only"> 
          <AttributeDesignator AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/amount" 
Category="http://kmarket.com/category" 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer" MustBePresent="true" /> 
        </Apply> 
        <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">10</AttributeValue> 
      </Apply> 
    </Condition> 
    <AdviceExpressions> 
      <AdviceExpression AdviceId="max-drink-amount-advice" AppliesTo="Deny"> 
        <AttributeAssignmentExpression 
AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:example:attribute:text"> 
          <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">You are not allowed to buy 
more tha 10 Drinks 
    from KMarket on-line trading system</AttributeValue> 
        </AttributeAssignmentExpression> 
      </AdviceExpression> 
    </AdviceExpressions> 
  </Rule> 
  <Rule RuleId="permit-rule" Effect="Permit" /> 
 
</Policy> 
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A.2 A Sample Request for KmarketBluePolicy 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Request xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:core:schema:wd-17" 
CombinedDecision="false" ReturnPolicyIdList="false"> 
  <Attributes Category="http://kmarket.com/category"> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/totalAmount" 
IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#integer">0</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Attributes> 
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:3.0:attribute-
category:resource"> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id" 
IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">k</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Attributes> 
  <Attributes Category="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject-category:access-
subject"> 
    <Attribute AttributeId="http://kmarket.com/id/role" 
IncludeInResult="false"> 
      <AttributeValue 
DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string">blue</AttributeValue> 
    </Attribute> 
  </Attributes> 
</Request> 
